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Modern science and technology are interwoven into a complex that is sometimes called 'techno-science': 
the progress of science is dependent on the sophistication of instrumentation, whereas the progress of 
‘high-tech’ instruments and apparatus is dependent on scientific research. Yet, how scientific research 
contributes to the development of instruments and apparatus for technological use, has not been 
systematically addressed in the philosophy of technology, nor in the philosophy of science. Philosophers of 
technology have taken an interest in the specific character of technological knowledge as distinct from 
scientific knowledge, thereby ignoring the contribution of scientific knowledge to technological 
developments. Philosophers of science such as the so-called New-Experimentalists, on the other hand, 
recently has become interested in the role of instrumentation, but merely focus on their role in testing 
scientific theories. By reviewing the two distinct developments and taking them a step further, an 
alternative explanation of the interwoveness of science and technology in scientific research is proposed. 
Additional to testing theories, instruments in scientific practice have an important role in producing 
reproducible phenomena, and these phenomena may have technological applications. Subsequently, 
technological development of these applications requires theoretical understanding of the phenomenon and 
of materials and physical conditions that produce it, is not for the sake of theories about the world, but for 
the sake of understanding a phenomenon and how it is technologically produced.  
 
1. Science and Technology.  
 
At present, many accept that modern science and technology are interwoven into a 
complex that is sometimes called 'techno-science': the progress of science is dependent 
on the sophistication of instrumentation, whereas the progress of ‘high-tech’ instruments 
and apparatus is dependent on scientific research. (c.p. Galison 1987, 1997; Baird and 
Faust, 1990; Radder, 1996, 2003). From this perspective, an understanding of how 
scientific research interacts with technology, in particular in the development of 
instruments and apparatus, is a topic for both philosophy of technology and philosophy of 
science. The focus taken here is how scientific research contributes to the development of 
instruments and apparatus for technological use. 
 In philosophy of technology, recent interest has been in the nature of 
technological knowledge, (e.g. Vincenti, 1990; Kroes, 1995; Pitt, 2000), rather than in 
how scientific research contributes to technological development. In that literature, 
science is valued for its heuristic role, whereas scientific approaches to the development 
of technology are non-existent. Conceptual and historical reasons may explain this focus. 
Traditionally, science and technology were distinct domains. The classical dichotomy 
between scientific knowledge (epistême) and technological knowledge (têchnè) was 
grounded in the ontological distinction between their objects: Scientific knowledge is 
about ‘things’ that exist of necessity, things that are universal, eternal, ungenerated and 
imperishable. Technological knowledge is about things that have their origin in their 
maker, ‘things’ that are variable, generated and perishable. This dichotomy has caused 
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conceptual confusion when trying to understand the relation between science and 
technology in modern scientific practices. Mario Bunge (1966) put forward the thesis that 
‘technology is applied science’. What he meant to say is that in technology the method 
and the theories of science are applied to solving practical problems. An outcome of this 
scientific approach is technological knowledge, which is made up of theories, grounded 
rules, and data. This thesis – and its implicit implication, which is that technology results 
from science – has been much debated in philosophy of technology of the 1970th and 
1980th. It was rejected on the basis of conceptual analyses of scientific and technological 
knowledge (e.g. Skolimowski, 1966). But also historical studies showed that the factual 
contribution of science to new technologies in the past, was less significant than many 
seemed to believe. Most technological devices were developed by craftsmen, independent 
of science. Engineers did not need a scientific understanding of the phenomena that they 
utilized and of the technological devices that they invented. For development and design 
they used phenomenological laws and ‘rules of thumb’, (c.p. Layton, 1974). 
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2. Instruments in Science.  
 
Philosophy of science, on the other hand, has long ignored the role of instruments and 
laboratory experiments in science. In a traditional philosophical view, the aim of science 
is the production of reliable, adequate, or true knowledge about the world. The role of 
experiments is testing hypotheses in controlled laboratory settings. But experimentation 
was seen as a mere data provider for the evaluation of theories, and the production of 
empirical knowledge by instruments is not a topic of philosophical concern. We observe 
nature through technological spectacles, which do not influence the resulting picture of 
nature, and instruments are instrumental to the articulation and justification of scientific 
knowledge of the world.  
 Some of the philosophical problems in traditional philosophy of science seem to 
result from this neglect of the role of instruments and experiments. One such problem for 
the positivistic idea of testing theories is the Duhem-Quine problem of under-
determination of theories by empirical evidence. If an experiment or observation is 
persistently inconsistent with theory, one could either revise the theory, or revise the 
auxiliary hypotheses – for instance those which are about the proper functioning of the 
instruments. Another severe problem to the positivistic image of science came from 
Popper (1959), who claimed that all observation is theory-laden. To him, observations, 
and observation-statements that represent experimental results, are always interpretations 
in the light of theories. Kuhn’s (1970) notion of paradigms was conceived in a similar 
vein: rather than observation, the paradigm is basic to our knowledge of the world, and 
observations only exist insofar they emerge within the paradigm. 
The view that non-empirical factors, such as ontology and theoretical background 
knowledge, are prior to observation and experiments, has been a severe threat to the 
traditional view that scientific theories are tested by means of an empirical and logical 
methodology, as it was conceived by logical positivism and logical empiricism, and 
opened the road to extreme sceptical appraisals of science. Social constructivists, for 
instance, have raised objections to the view that experimental results are accepted on the 
basis of epistemological or methodological arguments, and argue that social factors play 
an ineliminable role. (e.g. Bruno Latour, Harry Collins, and Andrew Pickering). 
 
 
3. New Experimentalism.  
 
New Experimentalists share the view that a number of problems, such as the under-
determination of theory by empirical knowledge, the theory-ladenness of observation, 
and extreme sceptical positions - such as social constructivist - that results from it, stem 
from the theory-dominated perspective on science of positivistic philosophers of science. 
They defend that focusing on aspects of experiments and instruments in scientific 
practice holds the key to avoiding these problems. Some of the key figures of this 
movement in the 1980th and early 90th are Ian Hacking, Nancy Cartwright, Allan 
Franklin, Peter Galison, Ronald Giere, Robert Ackermann, and more recently, Deborah 
Mayo. These authors do not accept the restriction to the logic of science that positivistic 
philosophers had set for themselves. Traditional philosophical accounts of how 
observation provides an objective basis for evaluation of theories – by the use of 
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confirmation theory or inductive logic – should be replaced by accounts of science that 
reflect how experimental knowledge is actually arrived at and how this knowledge 
functions. The traditional distinction between the ‘context of discovery’ and the ‘context 
of justification’, which motivated why philosophers should restrict their task to the logic 
of justification of scientific theories, is abandoned. New Experimentalists, instead, aim at 
an account of the rationality of scientists in scientific practices that includes how 
scientists reason about experiments, instruments, data, and theoretical knowledge. 
 This new philosophical tradition heavily relies on historical case-studies of 
science, which focus on aspects of experiments and instruments. These historically 
informed approaches in philosophy of science strengthened the tradition that may have 
been ushered in by Thomas Kuhn, and which is now called the 'history and philosophy of 
science'. The focus is on epistemological aspects of experiments, instruments, data and 
the processing of data, and different layers of theorizing. Thus, although, New 
Experimentalists admit that non-rational, sociological, and contingent factors may 
determine the course of science, they deny that sociological factors are determining 
methodological and epistemological criteria internal to scientific practices. The examples 
below aim to illustrate how the focus of New Experimentalist on the role of instruments 
provides new perspectives on scientific research. 
 
 
4. Instruments in Scientific Practice.  
 
Several authors have defended that the theory-ladenness problem of instruments can be 
excluded in some cases. A favoured example is observations by means of microscopes 
and other instruments with which objects can be made visible. (e.g. Hacking, 1983; Zik, 
2001; Chalmers, 2003). This also holds for data. Data given by instruments – such as 
data produced by a conductivity meter – may be given independent of a theory. 
Instruments create an invariant relationship between their operations and the world. After 
a change in theory, it will continue to show the same reading. However, the meanings of 
data – such as superconductivity - are not given by the data, since the data are interpreted 
as a phenomenon by theories. Thus, although data have an internal stability, which results 
of being reproducible by instruments, their meaning is neither manifest nor stable. (e.g. 
Ackermann, 1985; Gooding, 1990) In particular in exploratory experiments it requires the 
formation of new basic concepts, such as the notion of a current circuit in the case of 
Ampère, before the data produced by the instrument can be interpreted as a phenomenon 
(e.g. Harré, 1998; Steinle, 2002; Heidelberger, 2003). 
Nevertheless, also the view that data produced by instruments are independent of 
theory has been challenged. Even the most basic ‘data-generating’ instruments, such as 
thermometers, have gone through a long, intellectually and experimentally challenging 
route to knowing that these instruments tell us the temperature correctly. Finding 
empirical knowledge of temperature involved theoretical assumptions about the 
properties of matter. Therefore, a basic problem to a philosophical account of empirical 
science, which demands that theories should be justified by observations, is that 
observations involve theories, for instance about how things work. (e.g. Chang, 2004) 
 This latter finding also holds for other instruments and apparatus that inhabit our 
laboratories. According to Nancy Cartwright such instruments are to be understood as 
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nomological machines. A nomological machine is a fixed arrangement of components, or 
factors, with stable capacities that in the right sort of stable environment will give rise to 
regular behaviour. Laws represent this regular behaviour of nomological machines, which 
implies that those laws hold as a consequence of the repeated, successful operation of 
nomological machines. Therefore, laws - understood as a necessary regular association 
between properties - do not necessarily hold for the world beyond the nomological 
machine. (Cartwright, 1983, 1989, 1999, and also Harré, 2003; additionally, important 
articles on the role of instruments in scientific practice, are in Radder (ed.), 2003; see also 
Boon, 2004) 
 What these examples illustrate is that in scientific practice, theories and 
instruments are developed in a mutual relationship. Rather than being spectacles on the 
world, instruments take part in our theoretical knowledge. This has been well expressed 
by Hacking (1992), who claims that our preserved theories and the world fit together, less 
because we have found out how the world is, but because we have tailored each to the 
other. As a laboratory-science matures, it develops a body of types of theories and types 
of instruments and types of analysis of data that are mutually adjusted to each other. Any 
test of theory is related to instruments that have evolved in conjunction with it - and in 
conjunction with modes of data analysis. Conversely, the criteria for the working of the 
instruments and for the correctness of analyses are precisely the fit with theory. Thus, 
contrary to the Duhem-Quine thesis that theory is under-determined by data, Hacking 
argues that the constraints by these interrelated elements, narrows down the degrees of 
freedom for finding adequate theories. 
 
 
5. The interwoveness of Science and Technology.  
 
The picture that emerges is that instruments are not passive technological spectacles 
through which we perceive the object of science, i.e. ‘things’ that are universal, eternal, 
ungenerated and imperishable. The ontological distinction between the objects of 
epistême and têchnè becomes blurred once instruments are used in scientific 
investigations. Much of our empirical knowledge does not result from passive 
observation by means of instruments, but from interventions with instruments and 
technological devices. Observation as a source of empirical knowledge is extended by 
doing, by interacting and intervening with the world through our instruments. This claim 
of Hacking (1983) pulls down the traditional distinction between science and technology. 
The spectacle metaphor of instruments is replaced by a metaphor in which instruments 
and technological devices provide a material playground where we learn a lot; not about 
the traditional object of science, but about ‘things’ that are local, generated, variable, and 
perishable, i.e. about the traditional object of têchnè. But in their interventions and 
interactions with ‘things’, scientist concurrently search for a solid ground, i.e. for those 
‘things’ that do not change or that work in a reproducible way, which is the traditional 
object of epistême.  
 Thus, New Experimentalists’ focus on scientific practice gives a new perspective 
on the role of instruments, technological devices, and experiments in modern scientific 
practice, which also explains the interwoveness of science and technology. For, 
instruments have an important role in producing reproducible phenomena, and these 
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phenomena may have technological applications. For instance, the important contribution 
of the discovery of superconductivity was not that it confirmed a theory about the world; 
the important contribution was the simultaneous discovery of that phenomenon and how 
that phenomenon can be technologically produced. The urge for theoretical 
understanding of the phenomenon and of materials and physical conditions that produce 
it, is not for the sake of theories about the world, but for the sake of understanding this 
phenomenon and how it is technologically produced. In many cases theoretical 
understanding of a phenomenon is in the context of technological applications. This 
insight also involves a new perspective on the aim of science. The traditional view 
assumes that science aims at the production and justification of theories. The picture that 
has emerged from New Experimentalists’ study of scientific practice is that scientific 
research also aims at creating phenomena by means of instruments and technological 
devices, as well as at a theoretical understanding of phenomena and of the instruments 
that create them. This pictures a practice where science and technology, i.e. scientific 
research and development of technological devices, is interwoven. 
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